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An overlapping generational model of educational  investment  in a dual
labor  markets  is  presented  in  which  education  serves  both  as  a
screening  device  and  as  investment  in  human  capital.  Labor  market
dualism arises not only via the conventional technology (productivity)
differential  between  a  primary  and  a  secondary  sector,  but  also  by  a
higher  than  a labor  market  clearing  wage  in  the  primary  sector,  to
insure  no  shirking  by  the  workers  (an  element  shared  with  the
efficiency wage theories).  The  important determinants of the workers'
educational  investment  decision are  the  degree  of discipline  in  the
labor market and the cost of education.  Among the  three most commonly
discussed  educational  policies  of  maximizing  the  number  of  the
educated,  maximizing  the  primary  sector  employment  and  maximizing
social welfare, the  last one,  i.e.,  the most efficient one,  leads to a
lower level of education subsidy by the government.
An  earlier  version  of  this  paper  was  presented  in  1990  Western
Economic Association International Conference  at  San Diego,  June  29  -
July  3,  1990.  We  thank  an  anonymous  referee  for  comments  and
suggestions.
The University of Minnesota is  committed to the policy that all persons
shall have equal access to its programs, facilities, and employment
without regard to  race, color, creed, religion, national origin, sex,
age, marital status, disability, public assistance status, veteran
status,  or sexual orientation.I.  Introduction
There  has  been  a long  standing  debate  on  the  role  of  formal
education  (i.e.,  schooling) in  society.  The  prevailing human capital
school  argues  that  education  enhances  one's  potential  ability  and
productivity.  Educational  expenses  are viewed as  investment in human
capital,  whose  return  shows  up  as  higher  wages.  Since  the  1960's,
many  development  economists  have  accepted  this  view  and  argued  that
investment  in  education  should  be  thought  of  and  treated  in  the  same
way as  investment in physical  capital.  To  the advocates of the human
capital  school  (e.g.,  Schultz  [1961],  Becker  [1975]),  efficient
allocation  of  resources  requires  that  returns  on  education  be
equalized  with  returns  on  any  other  investment.  Thus,  the  high
returns on  education  typically  found  in  developing  countries  implies
that  more  resources  have  to  be  devoted  into  the  educational  sector
(see  Psacharopoulos and Woodhall  [1985]).
An  alternative  perspective  criticizes  the  idea  that  formal
education  raises  productivity,  as  fundamentally  erroneous.  Rather,
the  major  function  of  education  is  to  serve  as  a  screening  device
(Dore  [1976]).  This perspective  was  rooted  in  the  earlier  critical
views  of  formal  schooling  (e.g.,  Illich's  [1970]).  Spence  [1974]
presented  a formal  model  in  which  education  serves  as  a  signaling
device.  While  Spence's  analysis  does  not  negate  a  link  between
education and  productivity,  its  real  focus  is on  the  signal  that  is
conveyed by education.  As the worker's real productivity is  not fully
known,  educational  performance  serves  as  a  proxy  that  conveys
information  about  workers  productivity  related  attributes  (e.g.,
motivation, diligence, punctuality,  discipline,  and so  on).  In  thismodel,  it is optimal for more able workers  (whose cost of education is
low) to  seek more education, expecting a higher wage, while  less  able
workers  (whose cost  of education is high) would choose less  education
and  face  a  lower  wage.  Further,  such  wage  expectation  will  be
realized  as  long  as  the  employers  recognize  that  workers with  high
education  are  more  productive  than  the  workers  with  low  education.
This  idea  of  signaling  equilibrium  has  been  elaborated  in  game  theory
literature  as  a  sequential  equilibrium  (see  Cho  and  Kreps  [1987],
Banks  and  Sobel  [1987],  and  Noldeke  and  Van  Damme  [1990].)  In  an
extreme  version  of  the  model  in  which  education  does  not  increase  the
productivity at all, investment  in education is obviously wasteful.
The  above  debate has  a direct  bearing  on  the  question  asked by
this  paper which  is to  explain  the  presence  of  under-employment  and
unemployment among the educated workers  in  the  LDCs,  co-existent with
high  returns  on  education,  and  to  draw  appropriate  policy  guidelines.
The presence of  the educated under-employed and unemployed in many of
the  LDCs  has  been  a  longstanding  and  widespread  phenomenon  as
observed,  for  example,  over  a decade  and  half  ago  by  Gary  Fields
(1974).  Fields'  explanation for this phenomenon was  primary based on
the  oversupply of public education driven by political pressures  that
stem from demand by parents, unions, and the employers.  Fields' paper
asked an important question.  But  the reasons why demand for education
should exceed  its  supply remain unclear.  If the  reasons  for this  lie
in the higher returns to education associated with a limited number of
jobs  that  require  education,  then  a Harris-Todaro  (1970)  framework,
based  on  a primary-secondary  sector  duality  may  be  an  appropriate
starting point,  since  in a perfectly  competitive  labor  market  it  is
inconceivable  to  have  high  return  on  education with  persisting highunemployment rate.  Within this framework education acts a the lottery
in  that  it  is  a  necessary  but  not  a  sufficient  condition  for  entry
from  the  low  paying  secondary  sector  to  the  high  paying  primary
sector.  As  a  result, more  people  seek  education  than  find  primary
sector  jobs.  But  why  do  primary  sector  jobs  pay  higher?  The
Harris-Todaro  answer  has  the  usual  limitation  that  it  fixes  the
primary  sector  wage  exogenously,  via  institutional  rigidities.
Instead  we  endogenize  the  primary-secondary  sector  wage  duality  in
this  paper.  We  do  this  in  the  general  spirit  of  Stiglitz  and
Shapiro's  (1984) view of unemployment as a labor discipline device,  in
which  higher  wages  along  with  higher  unemployment  rates  reduce  the
worker  propensity  to  shirk.  Then  because  of  the  inability  of  the
employers  to  monitor  workers  costlessly, higher primary  sector wages
are offered to  discourage shirking, while  the workers caught shirking
are  fired.  In  our  model,  as  in  Stiglitz  and  Shapiro  (1984),
unemployment  in  the  primary  sector  is  a  labor  discipline  device  to
ensure  more  intensive  work  among  primary  sector  employees.  In  a
relatively undisciplined  labor market,  in  which hiring and  firing  is
done  through personal  networks  and promotions are  mainly done  through
seniority,  it  is  not  optimal  for  employers  to  hire  all  qualified
workers  even  though  the  marginal  worker's  value  product  is  greater
than the  reservation wages of the unemployed.  Thus a serious problem
Earlier,  Stiglitz  (1974)  and  Salop  (1979)  developed  labor  turnover
models, in which employers pay a higher wage to  reduce labor  turnover
by  reducing  the  number  of  quits  rather  than the  extent  of  shirking.
For a critical review of the first article, see Basu (1984).
Later we will use  the term underemployment for this purpose.of moral hazard exists since without any threat of dismissal and real
cost of unemployment, workers  in the primary sector may not work hard.
As  mentioned  above,  we  assume  that  high  paying  and  high
productivity  primary  sector  firms  limit  their  search  only  to  the
educated workers,  as  was  also  assumed by  Fields  (1974,  1975).  This
is  because  education  can  convey  information  about  the  degree  of
motivation,  discipline  and  other  characteristics  of  workers,  as
discussed earlier, and thus  the productivity of the firms  indirectly.
Education in our model thus plays  double  roles.  First,  it  is  a human
capital  investment  which  enables  workers  to  function  in  a  high
productivity  primary  sector.  At  the  same  time,  it  is a screening
device, because primary sector employers will not consider uneducated
workers.  Although  for  the  purposes  of  emphasizing  the  signaling
aspects we do not take explicit account of the human capital aspect of
education,  once  educated workers  are  placed  in  the  high productivity
primary  sector,  the  fact  that  educational  attainment  qualifies  a
worker  for  the  higher  productivity  primary  sector  (over  the  low
productivity  secondary  sector),  reflects both a social  and a private
gain in educational investment.  However, since entry into the primary
sector  involves  a  queue,  even  among  the  educated  workers,  the
investment will be wasted on those educated workers who fail  to  enter
the primary sector.
The  educated  workers  who  fail  to  enter  the  primary  sector  are
The difference between this  model and Fields'  1974  model  is already
discussed above.  The difference between this model and his 1975 model
is  that  in  the  latter  all  educated workers  find jobs  in  the  primary
sector  (so  there  is no  educated unemployed)  as  his  emphasis  in  that
paper  is  on  a  rural-urban  migration  and  not  on  the  educated
underemployed.absorbed, along with those not educated, into the low productivity-low
wage  secondary  sector  in  which  employment  is  always  guaranteed,
following  the  tradition  of  the  dual  economy  model  (Lewis,  1954).  We
will call the educated subgroup,  the underemployed, since they are not
strictly unemployed.  We  use  this  term  only for  the  educated  segment
because  its  members  are  absorbed  into  a  sector whose productivity  is
below  their  own  potential  productivity.  Evidence  suggests  that
education  does  not  enhance  the  earnings  of  those  in  the  secondary
sector  (e.g. Dickens  and Lang 1985).
Finally  we  use  an  overlapping  generations  model  to  capture  the
long  term  and  cross-generational  nature  of  educational  investments.
Thus,  we  integrate  strands  of  the  dual  labor  market  literature,  the
efficiency wage  theories,  the  signaling  theory, and  the human capital
literature,  in  an overlapping generations  model  in which  the  rate  of
underemployment, the  primary sector employment, and the primary sector
wage  are  all  endogenously  determined.  Following  the  formulation  of
the  model,  our  primary  goal  will  then  be  to  examine  the  effect  of
government  educational  subsidy  on  social  welfare.  There  is  an
important  equity  versus  efficiency  dimension  related  to  the
governments educational subsidies  in  the  LDCs which stirs  substantial
debate  among  scholars  and  policy  makers.  As  formal  education  is
expensive,  only  a small  fraction of population can afford high level
of  education  in  developing  countries.  Thus  an  increase  in  public
subsidy  encourages  more  people  from  less  privileged  groups  to  be
educated and qualified  for  jobs with high wages,  improving equity  in
the  society.  But, such increase  of educated workers  may create high
underemployment and waste  of resources,  if high productivity jobs  are
limited.  This would clearly increase inefficiency.The  next  section  describes  the  model  and  characterizes  the
equilibrium  solutions.  Section  III  will  examine  comparative  static
results  of  the  model.  Section  IV  examines  the  implications  of  an
optimal  policy  of  subsidizing  education  under  different  policy  goals
including one  of maximizing  social welfare.  Conclusions  are  offered
in section V.
II.  The  model  and equilibrium solution
Consider  an  overlapping  generations  model  of  the  following  type.
At  each  period,  there  are  two  groups  of  people  without  gender
difference:  old  and  young.  The  old  people  are  engaged  in  working,
whereas  the  young are  engaged  in  education or  leisure.  The  size  of
each group  is fixed at L for each period.  Each generation  lives  two
periods.  In  the  first  period,  the  individual  decides  whether  or  not
to  be  educated.  In order  to  get  an  education  (s)he has  to  incur  a
private  cost  c.  The  cost  c includes  opportunity  costs  as  well  as
direct  out-of-pocket  costs,  such  as  expenses  on  books  and  supplies.
In  the  second  period,  the  individual  is in  the  labor  market.  The
labor  market  is composed  of  four  types  of  agents:  educated  workers,
uneducated  workers,  primary  sector  employers,  and  secondary  sector
employers.  An  educated  worker  is  an  "old"  worker  who  received
education  in  the  previous period when young;  an uneducated worker  is
one who received no education in the previous period.
The  description  of  the  two  types  of  employers  follows  the
conventional dualistic  economy of a developing  country.  In addition
to  the  well  known  characterization  of  the  dualistic  economic
structure,  the  two  types  of  employers  differ  in  terms  of  production
6technology and labor requirement.  The  secondary sector has a constant
returns  to  scale  technology  with  marginal  productivity  of  workers
equaling w , independent  of whether  or not  a worker  is  educated.  We
4
assume that this  sector is competitive, and denote  its wage by w .
s
The  primary  sector  employers  hire  only  educated  workers.  Each
firm  has  a  production  function  Q.  - F.(J.),  where  Ji  is  firm  i's
effective  level of employment  (i  - 1,2,  ,M).  As  long as a worker does
not  shirk, he  contributes  one unit  of effective  labor;  otherwise, he
contributes  nothing  (see  below).  With  M  identical  primary  sector
firms,  aggregating the production function yields Q - F(J),  where J is
the  aggregate  effective  employment.  We  shall  assume  the  following
regarding the aggregate production function:
F' >  0, F" <  0, F(0) - 0,  F'(0) - o.  (1)
The  last  assumption is  necessary  to  ensure  that  there  is  always  some
positive  employment  in  the  primary  sector.  Further,  the  primary
sector  is  assumed to be competitive such that it yields zero profits.
A  worker  in  the  primary  sector  has  a  choice  of  shirking  or
not-shirking.  In  order  to  make  the  worker's  incentive  problem  as
simple  as  possible, we  shall  assume  that  the  worker's  disutility of
not shirking  (compared to  shirking)  is  exogenously  given as  e.  More
specifically,  we  shall  assume  that  the  worker's  has  a  von
Alternatively, we can assume  a downward sloping demand curve for  the
secondary  sector, making  the  secondary sector wage  endogenous.  This
will  inevitably  complicate  the  model  without  changing  its  essential
nature,  since  the young  take  wp  and we  for  the  next period as  given.
Moreover, it  is  the difference between the two wages, not  the  levels,
that influence the decision on education.
7Neumann-Morgernstern utility function with the form:
v - w  - e,  (2)
p
where  w  is  the  wage  paid  in  the  primary  sector.  As  the  primary
p
sector employers'  goal  is  to  maintain a highly motivated work  force,
with  no  shirkers,  they  are  willing  to  offer  higher  wages  than  a
competitive wage that would have resulted if all educated workers work
in the primary sector.
A worker who  shirks  faces  a probability  of dismissal,  q.  Given
the wage offer and the probability of dismissal,  the worker chooses to
shirk  or  not  by  comparing  the  level  of  utility  of  the  two
alternatives.  Thus, the worker will not shirk if,
w  - e  (1-q) w  + q w,  (3)
p  p  s
which can  be  rewritten  as,
w  - w  >  e/q  (3')
p  s-
Notice  that  the  first  form  of  the  inequality  assumes  that  a
dismissed  worker  from  the  primary  sector,  can  always  obtain  a
secondary  sector  job.  Thus,  at  any  given  period,  secondary  sector
workers  include  educated  workers  who  fail  to  obtain  primary  sector
jobs and other educated workers who shirk and are  thus fired (although
One can envision a  model  in which  the worker  is  allowed  to choose  a
level of shirking and a dismissal probability depends on the  level of
shirking  as  well  as  the unemployment  rate.  We  decided  to  adopt  the
simpler form, as we felt that such generalization would complicate the
model substantially without giving additional  insights.in equilibrium,  there will be no  such workers  as  long as  the primary
sector wage is high enough to  compensate the utility of shirking),  and
the old uneducated workers.  Thus, strictly speaking, there  is no true
unemployment  in our model.  Instead, we observe underemployment of the
educated workers.  This  is  defined  by  the  ratio  of  educated  workers
who  fail  to  get  the  primary  sector  jobs  to  the  total  number  of
educated workers.  Also we assume  that  there  is  no disutility of work
in the secondary sector.
The dismissal probability is  assumed to be an increasing function
of the underemployment rate u:
q - q(u)  with q'(u) > 0 and q(0) - 0.  (4)
As  the marginal productivity of a shirking worker in  the primary
sector is  assumed to be zero, primary sector firms would be willing to
pay a wage high enough  to  ensure  that workers  do not  shirk.  This  is
found from inequality  (3')  which is  the nonshirking constraint  (NSC)
on  the  primary  sector  employers.  Substituting  from  (4) into  (3')
permits  the NSC to be expressed in terms of the variables w  and u:
p
w  - w  > e/q(u)  (3")
p  s-
The  profit  maximization  condition  for  the  primary  sector  firms
ensures  that:
w  - F'(J).  (5)
p
If  we  denote  the  total  number  of  educated  workers  by  N,  the
underemployment  rate u becomes:
u - (N - J)/N.  (6)
Substituting  from  (6) into  (3"),  the  minimum  primary  sector  wageemployers are willing to  offer  to discourage shirking, consistent with
the marginal productivity condition (5),  becomes:
w  - w  +  e/q(l-J/N) - F'(J)  (7)
p  s
The  two  equalities  in  (7) completely describe  the  equilibrium of  the
labor  market  of  the  second  period,  given  the  number  of  educated
workers (N)  from the first period.  This is depicted in Figure 1.  The
NSC  for  the  primary sector  employers  is upward sloping,  i.e.,  higher
w  is associated with higher J and vice versa  (given N).  Intuitively
P
a larger J, i.e.,  a lower underemployment rate, reduces the penalty of
shirking  by  reducing  the  probability  of  dismissal.  Thus  employers
must raise w  to  discourage shirking.  In the limit, as J approaches N
P
(underemployment  rate  approaches  zero),  w  approaches  infinity.
P
Hence, full employment is  not possible in our model.  The second curve
is  the  downward  marginal  productivity  curve.  Given  the  number  of
educated  workers  (N),  the  equilibrium  values  of  J  and  w  are
P
determined by the intersection of the  two curves.
Fig. 1  About Here
The next question is  how to determine N in the first period.  In
the  first period, the young  (or  their parents)  decide whether  or not
to pursue education, based on their expectation of wage  rates and  the
probability  of  getting  a primary  sector  job.  If  education  is not
chosen, primary  sector  employment  is precluded  permanently.  Thus,
lifetime wealth becomes  w  s , where  6 is  the  discount factor  (0<3<1).
10However,  if  education  is  chosen,  then  a primary  sector job  with  the
wage  w  may  be  found  in  the  next  period,  with  probability  of  (1-u).
P
Alternatively no primary sector jobs may be found with the probability
(u),  in which case the secondary sector employment with the wage w  is
the only option.  In order to  get education, the worker must bear the
cost  of  education, c.  In  the  absence  of  income  or  endowments,  the
young will borrow to  finance  the private portion of educational cost,
with the  interest rate assumed equal to  the discount rate.  Thus  the
young maximize the  discounted lifetime utility by comparing secondary
sector  earning with  the  expected primary  sector  earnings.  With  risk
neutrality assumed and with no shirking  in equilibrium, this implies:
Max  (Pw  ;  s  [(l-u) w  +  u w] - c)
In equilibrium the  two earning streams are equal,
w  - =[(l-u)  w  + u w ] - c  (8)
p  s
yielding the equilibrium unemployment rate of:
w  - w  - c/M(l-u).  (8') p  s
Since J and w  are  found, conditional upon N, the value of u, in (8')
P
is also a function of N.  However, u is also  given by u - 1-J/N  (eq.
(6)).  Thus,  the  size  of  the  education  sector, N,  is  determined  in
equilibrium  when  workers  have  rational  expectation  regarding  the
primary  sector wage  and underemployment  rate  that  they will  face  in
the next period.
6In a later section education will be allowed to be partly subsidized
by the tax paid by the old workers.
11III.  Comparative statics
To  perform  comparative  static  exercises  one  would  differentiate
totally, the  three equilibrium conditions,  equations  (7) and  (8'),  in
the  three endogenous variables, w ,  J and N.  However, it  is easier to
work  with  the  equilibrium  underemployment  rate  (u)  instead  of  the
number of educated workers  (N).  Moreover,  as J  is  solely determined
by  the  firms'  profit  maximization  condition  (5),  we  can  solve  the
equilibrium w  and u by considering only (3")  and (8').
P
Fig. 2 About Here
Figure  2 depicts these two equations graphically in  (w ,u)  space,
with equation (3")  having a downward slope and equation  (8')  having an
upward  slope.  The  star  ('*')  denotes  an  equilibrium  quantity.
Changes  in  any of  the  parameters  are  represented by  shifting  one  of
the  two  curves  in  the  figure.  For  example,  a rise  in the  utility of
shirking,  e,  shifts  the  curve  representing  (3")  to  the  right,
resulting  in  a  new  equilibrium  with  higher  w  and  higher  u.
P
Intuitively, with a  larger e, the  primary sector  firms must raise w
P
to  discourage  shirking.  At  the  same  time,  the  underemployment  rate
(the penalty  for  shirking) would rise because workers  are  willing to
trade  higher  underemployment  rate  for  higher  wages.  Also,  from
equation  (5) higher w  implies  lower J.  However,  the  effect  on  the
P
number  of educated  (N)  is  ambiguous,  because  a  higher w  encourages
P
education  among  the  young,  while  the  higher  underemployment  rate
reduces the chances of entering the primary sector.  To summarize:
12*  *  *k  *  <
dJ /de <  0, du /de >  0, dw /de >  0, dN /de  0.  (9.a)
p  >
If  the  cost  of  education  (c)  rises,  the  curve  representing
equation  (8')  shifts  to  the  left,  resulting  in  a  higher  new
equilibrium  for  w  and  a  lower  new  equilibrium  underemployment,  u.
P
Here, higher cost of education causes workers  to demand higher primary
sector  wage  and/or  lower  underemployment  rate  in  order  to  recover
their  educational  investment.  At  the  same  time  firms  would  like  to
increase  w  by  a  only  minimum  amount  so  that  the  NSC  is  just
p
satisfied.  For a given utility of shirking, e, this  would be achieved
by combining some wage increase with a decrease in  the probability of
lay-off, in  the  case of  shirking, which is  consistent with a drop  in
the underemployment rate.  The  lower underemployment rate necessitates
that  the number of  educated workers  (N) should decrease  by more  than
the  number  of  jobs  in  the  primary  sector  (J)  in  proportion.  To
elaborate, note  that  although  the higher primary  sector wage  and the
lower  underemployment  rate  should  induce  a  rise  in  the  number  of
educated workers,  this will be  dominated by the  reduction of educated
workers due to  the higher cost of education.  To summarize:
dJ  /dc <  0, du /dc <  0, dw /dc > 0,  dN /dc < 0  (9.b)
p
The  effect  of  the  discount  factor  is  just  the  opposite  to  the  cost  of
education  (eq.  (8')).  For  example,  a  rise  in  P  increases  workers
valuation  of  the  future  relative  to  the  present  and  thus  their
incentive  to  choose  education  for  future  primary  sector  employment.
Thus,  firms  can effort  to offer smaller w  (accompanying a rising J)
P
and also  the underemployment rate can be higher in this case:
dJ /d3 >  0,  du /dB >  0,  dw /d3 <  0, dN /d9 >  0  (9.c)
P
13Higher  wage  in  the  secondary  sector  decreases  the  cost  of
shirking  (eq.  (3 ")),  and  also  decreases  the  incentive  to  enter  into
the  primary  sector  (eq.  (8')).  Thus,  primary  sector  firms  would
respond by raising the wage w  (which causes a reduction in the number
of jobs).  However,  the  underemployment  rate  will  not  change  due  to
the  restrictive  assumption  of  risk neutrality  and  additivity  in  our
utility  function.  In this  case, both  curves  in  Figure  2 shift  up by
an equal  amount,  leaving u  unchanged.  If  the  underemployment  rate
stays the  same, the  reduction in  the number of primary  sector jobs  is
proportional reduction in the number of educated workers.  Thus:
dJ  /dw  <  0, du /dw  - 0, dw /dw  >  0, dN /dw  <  0  (9.d)
s  s  p  s  s
In  order  to  solve  for  the  equilibrium  level  of  variables
explicitly, we parameterize the q(u) function as:
q(u) - 7u,  (7 > 0)  (10)
where 7  represent the degree of discipline in the primary sector labor
market.  A  high  7  implies  a  highly  disciplined  labor  market  in  the
sense  that given any underemployment  rate, workers are  more likely to
be punished (dismissed) when they shirk.  Then, it can be shown that:
u  - Me  / (fe + 7c),  (11.a)
w  -w  + e/7 + c/P  (11.b)
p  s
w  - F'(J )  (11.c)
P
N  - (1  +  Be/7c)  J  . (ll.d)
Equation  (ll.b)  shows  that w  falls  a 7  rises:  The more  disciplined
p
the primary sector labor market,  the less  likely workers  are  to  shirk
in  which  case  firms  need not  pay  as  high  a wage.  The  lower  wage
14increases  the  number  of  primary  sector  jobs  (eq.  (11.c)).  The  NSC
implies that  a smaller w  can  be  accompanied  by  a  reduced  probability
p
of firing and thus  a lower underemployment  rate  (eq.  (11.a)).  Again,
the number  of educated workers may change  in either direction, as  the
lower w  reduces N but a lower u increase it  (eq.  (11.d)).  To  sum:
p
*  *  w  *  <
dJ  /dy >  0, du /dy <  0, dw /dy <  0, dN /dy >0  (12)
IV.  Effects of educational  subsidy on social welfare
In  this  section,  we  shall  examine  the  effects  of  government
subsidy on education.  Some have argued that education is  a basic need
and that  it has  to be  subsidized by the  government.  However,  subsidy
in education is a little different from  the subsidy on other  items  in
the  basic  need basket.  There  is a spill-over  effect  on  the  labor
market, when government subsidizes the education.
In order  to make  the  story  simple,  let us  assume  that  the  total
per  capita  educational  expense,  s, is  exogenously  given,  and  the
production  of  education has  a constant  returns  to  scale  technology.
Out of the  total per capita expense, workers are  only required to pay
c. Let us denote  0  as  the fraction of the workers' share.  Thus  1-0  is
the public sector's  share of educational expenses.  Obviously a large
0  implies  little  educational  subsidy.  With g as  the  per  capita cost
of education borne by the government, we have:
s - g+  c  (13)
and,  0 - c/s,  0 <  0 <  1.  (14)
The  availability  of  subsidy  reduces  private  expenditures  on
15education,  and hence  affects  the workers'  decision on  education.  At
the  same  time,  financing  the  subsidy  requires  taxes,  which  reduce
disposable income.  Depending on the  tax scheme,  the latter  issue may
or  may  not  affect  the  relative  attractiveness  of  money  income
vis-a-vis leisure.  Thus,  it  is  useful  to  distinguish between the  two
effects of taxes.  For  this  reason, we consider two cases;  a lump-sum
tax that  does not distort the wage versus  leisure trade-off, and only
reflects  the first effect  (income-versus-educational cost trade-offs),
and a proportional  income  tax  system of constant  tax  rate with fixed
7 deduction of w  ,  that reflects both  the first and the  second effect. s
We shall assume that the government always balances the budget.
We  will  focus  on  three  policy  objectives  commonly  discussed  in
the  context  of  educational  investment:  1) maximizing  the  size  of the
education  sector  (N);  2)  maximizing  the  size  of  primary  sector
employment  (J);  and  3)  maximizing  social  welfare  (W).  Clearly
the third policy objective favors efficiency criterion.
A.  Lump-sum taxes
We  will  consider  the  implication  of  the  first  two  policies
(maximizing  J  and  N),  followed  by  a  policy  of  maximizing  social
welfare.  Since  the  lump-sum  tax  system  does  not  alter  the  marginal
rate of substitution between money income and leisure,  the equilibrium
solutions  in  eq.  (11)  will be  directly applicable to  this  case.  We
shall  drop  the  star  ('*')  notation  for  simplicity.  Substituting w
p
7
In addition to  its prevalence in many countries, such a tax system is
used here because it  is analytically more tractable.
8
Notice  that we are keeping the assumption of eq.  (10)  for analytical
convenience.
16from  (ll.c)  into  (ll.b)  we get:
F'(J)  - e/7 + sO/l  + w  ,  (15)
whose  implicitly differentiation with  respect  to  0  yields:
dJ/dO  - s/3F"(J) < 0  . (16)
Also from (ll.d),
dN/dO  - (1 + 9e/7c)dJ/dO  - PeJ/sO2  < dJ/dO  < 0  (17)
Hence  it  is  clear  that  the  policy  either  to  maximize  the  number  of
educated  workers  or  to  maximize  primary  sector  employment  is  that
government should fully subsidize education (0  - 0).
We now analyze  the  socially  optimal  policy.  The  social welfare
is  defined  as  the  sum  of  individual  utilities.  (Firms  get  zero
profits and the government balances  the budget.)  In equilibrium, when
shirking is  absent, the utility of the older generation (consisting of
primary and secondary sectors workers) is  income  net of tax, and that
of  the  younger  generation  is  income,  for  those  in  the  secondary
sector,  minus  cost  of education, for  those  choosing education.  This
becomes gross national product minus depreciation on human capital, or
net national product.  (Note that human capital depreciates entirely in
one period).  In the lump-sum tax case this  is:
W - w J + w  (N-J) + w  (L-N) - T  - cN
p  s  s
- (w  - w )J  + w L - sN
p  s  s
- (1 - p/6)  (e/7 +  Os/f)J  + w  L,  (18)
where T  is  the  total tax paid by workers.  The second equality follows
from  T  - gN,  the  government's  balanced  budget  constraint.  By
differentiating W with respect to 0, we get:
17dW/dO  - (s/l  +  e/7-y 2 )J  +  (e/7  +  Os/l)(1-P/O)  dJ/dO,
which implies that dW/d8 >  0 if 0  <  P.  In other words,  if the subsidy
rate  is  too  large  (i.e,  if  1-0  >  1-8),  then  a  reduction  in  its  level
increases social welfare monotonically, and conversely, an increase in
9 its  level decreases  social  welfare.  This  occurs because a very high
subsidy  rate  means  that  a  large  number  of  the  young  will  choose
education.  This  will  increase  the  underemployment  rate,  and  thus
social waste because  of  society's  inability  to  utilize  the  skills  of
the  educated  workers  in  more  productive  primary  sector.  Instead,
these  educated workers  will be  put  into  the  secondary  sector, where
10 education does not  increase  their productivities nor wages.  On the
other  hand,  when  0  >  P,  an  optimal  0  can  be  obtained  by  equating  the
above equation to zero.1
The  three  policy  objectives  are  depicted  in  Figure  3,  in  which
the  case  of  a monotonically  increasing  W(8)  function  is  denoted  as
case  1 and  the  case  of  an  interior  optimum  0 is  denoted  as  case  2.
(Note that since 0  > P  is only a necessary condition for the existence
of  an  interior  optimum,  it  is  possible  that  such  an  interior  optimum
9Note  that  Since  the  time period under  consideration  is  of the  order
of one generation, P will be substantially smaller than one.
1There may be  some  potential  social  externalities  from  a society of
highly  educated  people  even  if  they  stay  in  the  secondary  sector.
This  issue  is not analyzed in the present paper.
T 1he second order condition in this case,
d2W/de2 - - 2e8J/y?3 +  2(e6/ye2  +  s/p) dJ/dG
+  (e/7 +  Os/3)(l - 5/0)  d2J/dO 2  <  0,
9  2  2 is globally satisfied when F  <  0 (which ensures d J/dO  <  0).
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(19)does not exist even if the condition is  satisfied).  From either case,
the  trade-off between efficiency and equity is apparent.  A government
policy  of  maximizing  either  the  size  of  the  education  sector,  or  the
primary sector employment, requires  full educational  subsidy but  does
not  maximize  welfare.  On  the  other  hand,  a  welfare  maximizing
educational  policy  requires  either  no  subsidy  (case  1)  or  some  (but
less than full)  subsidy  (case 2).
Fig. 3 About Here
B.  Proportional income tax with the deduction of wS
The government budget constraint in this case  is:
r(w  - w )J  - gN.  (20)
p  s
The  left hand side of  this  equation  is  the  tax  revenue and its  right
hand  side  is  the  educational  expenditures  of  the  government.  The
workers' NSC and the educational investment decision rule respectively
become:
(1 - r)(w  - w )  - e/yu.  (21)
p  s
(1 - r)(w  - w )  - c/P(l-u).  (22)
p  s
Solving  these  equations  together,  we  get  the  same  equilibrium
underemployment  rate  as  in  (1l.a),  and  therefore  also  the  same  J/N
ratio as  in  (ll.d):
u - Be/(Be +  yc),  (23.a)
N - (1 + ,e/7c) J.  (23.b)
Substituting u from  (23.a) back into the NSC  (21),  we get:
19(24) (1  - )(w  - w  - (e/7 + c/f). p  s
The social welfare  is given by:
W  - (l-r)(w -w )  J + w L - cN - (1/0 - l)cN + wsL  ,  (25)
p  s  s  s
where  the  second  equality  follows  from  (24)  and  then  (23.b).  From
this  we  see  that  for  given  B  and  ws  maximizing  social  welfare  is
equivalent  to  maximizing private  investment  in education  (cN).  This
is  because,  workers  have  a  guaranteed  rate  of  return  (1/P  - 1)  on
educational  investment.  Workers'  rationality  ensures  that  social
welfare,  which  is  equivalent  to  their  total  net  wealth,  is  maximized
when the workers maximize  their investment.
To find the link between the tax rate and the educational subsidy
rate,  we  substitute  for  w  - w  (from  eq.  (24))  and  N  (from  eq.
p  s
(23.b))  into the government's budget constraint and rearrange  to get:
(1/  - 1)6
r - (27)
1 +  (1/e  - 1)
From  this  expression,  we  see  that  dr/dO  <  0.  Thus,  the  higher  the
12
subsidy rate, the higher is  the  tax rate.2  Further, no subsidy (0-1)
implies r - 0, while full subsidy (0 - 0) implies that r - 1.
First we analyze the primary sector by studying how it changes as
the subsidy rate varies.  Substituting r into  (24),  and realizing that
F'(J)  - w ,  we get:
12
This  plausible  result  may  not  obtain  for  some  other  income  tax
system, as  higher  subsidy rate may  increase the  tax base  (J) so  that
it could actually reduce the  tax rate.
20F'(J) - [1  + (1/0  - 1),]  [ey/  +  s/l3]  + ws,  (27)
which  involves  only  one  endogenous  variable  J,  given  the  policy
parameter  of  0.  Comparing  the  above  equation with  the  lump-sum  tax
case  (eq.  (15)),  one  would  recognize  an  extra  term  (1/0  -1)A  which
represents  the decrease of marginal utility of money income because of
the  introduction of  income  tax.  Hence,  it  is  clear  that  at a  given
rate  of  education  subsidy  primary  sector  employment  would  be  smaller
in the case of the proportional tax, that  is,
J (0) > JP(0),  0 <  0 <  0,  (28)
where  the  superscripts  e  and  p  represent  lump  sum  tax  and
proportional tax respectively.
A
The value  of  6 which  maximizes  J,  i.e.  B,  is  either  1 or  less
than 1. 1 3   If  s  <  ef2/7(l-f)  then  J  is  maximized  at  0 - 1. 1 4   This
suggests  that the no subsidy policy maximizes J if educational cost is
sufficiently  high,  or  labor  market  is  not  very  disciplined,  or
13 1We shall use the hat ('^')  notation to denote an optimal quantity of
6, that maximizes the quantity in the subscript  (in this case, J).
14Differentiating (27)  with respect  to 6, we obtain:
dJ/dO  - [s/l  - s  - el/yT2 ]/F"(J),
and d2J/d 2  - [2ep/ 3  - F'  ' ' (J)(dJ/d)2  ]/F"(J),
where  the  second  equation has  been  derived by  first  differentiating
the  first  equation  in  6,  and  then using  it  again  in  the  resulting
expression.  Setting the first equation to zero, we  find an optimum 6.
The  local  concavity  of  J  in  the  neighborhood  of  6  is  guaranteed, J
i.e.,  from eq.  (31):
d J/de2  p  - 2e /70 3F"(J) <  0.
J
The second order condition will be globally concave  if F'''< 0 as
in the  lump sum tax.
21disutility  of  work  is  very  high,  or  discount  rate  is  very  low.
Otherwise,  J  will  have  the  interior  maximum:
(  ef  1i/2
J - ys(l/A  - l)J  (29)
In this case, the following hold:
AP  A
dO  /d< <  0,  dO/de  >  0.  (30.a)
Several  interesting points  emerge  from these  results.  First, a more
disciplined  labor  market  (y),  permits  a  higher  optimal  subsidy  rate
A
(1-P  ).  This  is because in a disciplined labor market, primary sector
J
wage  need  not  be  as  high  to  prevent  shirking,  and  thus  number  of
primary sector jobs  is  larger.  Thus optimum subsidy rate is higher as
fewer educated workers  end up  in  the  secondary  sector  (less  waste).
On the  other hand,  If  the  labor  market  is  not very  disciplined,  the
government  should  not  subsidize  the  education  too  much,  since  the
social waste  (educated workers  in the secondary sector)  increases, via
higher w  and lower J, as  the subsidy rate  increases.
P
Secondly,  larger  e  implies  a  greater  disutility  of  work,  thus
inducing a higher primary sector wage and with that a reduction in the
number  of primary  sector  jobs.  Social  waste  is  therefore  higher  if
more  educated  workers,  via  a  higher  subsidy  rate,  end  up  in  the
secondary sector.  Thus  larger e implies reduced optimal subsidy rate.
Two  additional  parametric responses are:
A  A
de  /ds <  0,  dO  /dB >  0.  (30.b) J  J
A  high  cost  of  education  raises  the  optimal  subsidy  rate  aimed  at
maximizing  primary  sector  jobs,  at  such  a  rate  as  to  permit  the
proportion borne workers and the government to be shared  (since c-es,
22equation  (29)  shows  that  c  rises  with  s / ).  An  increase  in  the
discount  factor  reduces  the  degree  of  optimal  subsidy  because  it
causes  workers  to  overinvest  in  the  future.  This  reduces  primary
sector  wages  and  increase  J  (see  the  discussion  preceding  equation
(9.c)),  reducing  the  need  for  subsidy.
To  study  social  welfare  we  first  express  W  in  terms  of  J  (by
substitution  from  (23.b)  into  (25)),  to obtain:
W - (1 - B)  (e/7 + Os/6)  J + w L.  (31)
s
15
It  can  then  be  shown  that: 1
A  A  A
^  ^  ^P
aW  > 8J >  N . (32)
These  are  shown  in  Figure  4,  where  W  reaches  its  peak  after  J  has
reached  its  peak,  which  in  turn  occurs  after N  has  reached  its  peak.
Thus,  a  smaller  subsidy  (1-0)  is  needed  to  maximize welfare  than  to
maximize either N or J.  As between the  education maximization policy
and the employment maximization policy, maximizing the former incurs a
greater efficiency loss  as  greater number of educated workers are  shut
15Differentiating this with respect to 8, we obtain:
dW/dO - (1-P)  (e/7 + Os/f)  dJ/de + (l-8)(s/P)J,
and d2W/d 2  - (l-,)(e/7 +  0s/P)  d2J/d 2 +  2(1-f)(s/fi)  dJ/dO.
Setting dW/dO  - 0  yields optimum  W,  which maximizes W  if dW/d 2  is
assumed to be negative.  Now from the dW/dO  expression it follows that
at  thea  point  where  0  maximizes  J,  W  is  still  rising  in  0  [i.e.
dW/d0(0  ) - (l-9)(s/f)J >  0],  and at  the point where  0  maximizes W,  J
is  already falling  in 0  [i.e.,  dJ/d0(0  )  - - (s/9)J/[e/y  +  0s/p]  <  0].
It  follows  that  6 >  0 .   Assuming  N  is  single  peaked  and  using  a
J  N  a,  A
similar argument as above, we can also show that,  O  >  0. *J  N
23out  from  gainful  employment  in  the  primary  sector  and  are  thus
absorbed into the less productive secondary sector.
Fig. 4 About Here
V.  Summary and Conclusion
We  have  examined  the  role  of  education  in  a  dual  labor market.
Education  serves  both  as  a  screening  device  to  screen  workers  for
primary  sector  jobs  and  as  human  capital  device  to  enhance
productivity.  Underemployment  is  viewed  as  the  inability  to  obtain  a
primary  sector  job  among  those  qualified  educationally,  and  thus
settle for the available secondary sector employment.  Underemployment
also serves as a worker discipline device  to discourage shirking.  The
paper  incorporates these concepts  in  a simple  overlapping generations
model,  where  the  young  must  decide  on  education  and  the  old  are
employed either in the primary sector or  in the secondary sector.
Socially optimal  educational policies  are  investigated where  the
policy instrument  is the extent of subsidizing education. The analysis
is  conducted  under  two  tax  schemes  to  finance  the  subsidy;  a
nondistortionary lump sum tax scheme and a distortionary income tax in
which  income  up  to  the  secondary  sector  wage  is  deducted.  Many
conclusions  emerge,  the  most  of  which  are  that  the  size  of  optimal
subsidy  is  smaller  in  the  case  of  a  welfare  maximizing  educational
policy  than in  the case  of alternative policies.  In  turn, a  goal  of
maximizing  the  number  of  primary  sector  jobs  requires  less  subsidy
than one  maximizing the  size  of  the  education  sector  (the number of
the  pupils).  Also,  an  income  tax  regime  which  penalizes  work
24vis-a-vis leisure yields  lower primary sector employment at  any given
rate of subsidy.  Further, when maximizing the  size  of primary  sector
is  the  goal,  it  is  found  (in  one  of  the  tax  schemes)  that  a  more
disciplined  labor market or one with a lower discount rate permit  for
a  larger  optimal  educational  subsidy,  while  a  labor  market  prone  to
shirking,  or  one with a high  discount  rate  implies  a smaller optimal
subsidy rate.  In this case,  the  optimal subsidy  rate also rises with
an increase  in the  total cost of education.
An important  corollary to  our  analysis  is  the  equity aspects of
our  results.  For  example,  over-subsidizing  the professionals  for  the
purpose  of primary  sector  employment  is not  only  socially suboptimal
but may  also  be  unegalitarian  since  such  resources  (wasted on  those
who  fail  to enter the primary sector) may have been more appropriately
used  to  improve  the welfare of secondary sector employees.
The  analysis  does  abstract  from  possible  externalities  of
education.  First, some output from the education (such as  inventions)
may be a public good.  Second, even if the educated are only partially
in  employed  in  primary  sector,  some  of  them  may  set  up  own
entrepreneurial  activities.  Such externalities may be  too  intangible
and ambiguous  to model precisely but may be nonetheless  important.
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